# This most unusual naval photograph shows a battleship division steaming in column formation "somewhere in the Atlantic." The camera man on No. 1 has snapped vessel No. 2 at the instant of firing a salvo from its 14-inch main battery. Our later superdreadnoughts (and Japan's) will carry even heavier weapons, twelve 16-inch guns each.

#### Eight Pro-Essential to Complete the Eight Spite of gramme, H. C. Bywater Finds, in Vation Its Impoverishing Demands on N Pacific."

By HECTOR C. BYWATER, Author of "Sea Power in the

Copyright, 1921, by THE NEW YORK HERALD.

New York Herald Bureau. 1 London, Aug. 25. DAY or two after the announcement

that President Harding had invited the leading Powers to take part in a conference at Washington on disarmament and Far Eastern problems, I had an interview with a Japanese gentleman who, without holding official status, is in close touch with the Tokio Government and with Japanese politics in general. To my question as to what he thought of the American move, he replied, in substance:

"We Japanese would welcome any practical step toward the reduction of armaments which impose such a serious burden on the nations. Japan, in fact, would be the very last country to oppose such a step, because her armaments are essentially defensive in character. We assume, however, that the American Government recognizes the absolute necessity to Japan of completing her 'eight-eight' programme. which represents the minimum standard of naval strength consistent with the safety of the Empire. I feel sure that the Imperial authorities would not consent discuss a revision of this programm which, after years of effort, has at lengt been embodied in the statute book. B with this reservation we shall go to th conference sincerely desirous of helpi to achieve the noble ideals that the Ame Ican President has enunciated."

If my informant's remarks faithfully flect the official Japanese vie , it is n altogether clear what basis can be four for restricting naval armaments in th Pacific, for the Japanese "eight-eight" programme is the dominating factor of the whole situation,

# What Japan Says Officially

About the Eight-Eight Idea The inception and significance of this

programme are explained in the following official statement, which has been communicated to me direct from the Japanese Navy Department:

"It was after the Chino-Japanese war, but before the war with Russia, that the Imperial Japanese Navy realized the necessity of possessing two squadrons, and adopted a naval policy to that effect as being the irreducible minimum for the defence of the Island Empire. At the time of the war with Russia, Japan was in possession of two squadrons, each consisting of six capital ships, i. e., six battleships and six armored cruisers. From the experience gained in that war, the Japanese Navy decided to have two squadrons, each comprising eight capital ships, and laid down the plan for organizing the socalled 'eight-eight' squadrons, each ship being less than eight years old from the date of completion.

Just at that moment, however, there occurred a farreaching evolution in the

due to the apught. This design of capital ships, king all prepearance of the dread and Japan event had the result of m with the dreadnought ships obsole was, therefore, confronte necesity of building straining noughts. The financial condi of this ever, rendered the execut scheme most difficult, and th the time being, had to be co a building programme of fourteen capital ships; but the aim of putting into commiss battleships and eight battle was repeatedly announced Houses of Parliament.

The 1920-28 naval programm sanctioned by the Imperial D July, 1920, and when the previous current schemes are completed will be in possession of a main fleet comprising sixteen capital s This will be at the end of Marc's, 1928. The following tables show the number of vessels of each type for which provision is made, together with the amount of money allotted for construction each year, and the period covered by the programme: Programme Programme

	*0.40. **	*****
	Yen.	Yen.
1920-21	105,434,409	89,391,224
1921-22	123,336,807	44,914,440
1922-23	121,160,589	79,765,070
1923-24	58,629,666	96,104,988
1924-25	********	109,811,444
1925-26		112,054,794
1926-27		113,692,857
		115,877,355
Total		. 761,112,152
Rattleships		4
	1921-22 1922-23 1923-24 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 Total. Battleships Battle cruisers. Cruisers Topedo boat destroy Gunboats Fleet auxiliaries	Yen. 1920-21 105,434,409 1921-22 123,336,807 1922-23 121,160,589 1923-24 58,629,666 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27

To this total must be added the amounts set aside for naval construction in the supplementary budget passed in March, 1921, viz.: Yen 37,066,-705 for 1920-21, and yen 105,050,112

In his covering letter transmitting this official statement to me a distinguished Japanese naval officer makes some interesting observations on the naval policy of his country.

"Statements have appeared in the press." he writes, "to the effect that Japan and the United States are building their war vessels against each other. This, however, as you will note from the inclosed state ment, is not the case. Our present naval scheme was originated as early as the year 1906, i. c., just after the Russo-Japanese war, in accordance with the tactical opinicn of our naval experts. During that war the United States of America gave us every possible assistance, and there could be no possible reason for imagining that the naval scheme was directed against the United States."

#### Our Own Plans Laid in 1916, So Idea of Race Fades

If the Japanese authorities are perturbed at this supposed misreading of the motives that underlie their naval policy they should remember that a large section of the Japanese press habitually refers to the eight-eight" programme as though it were a reply to the American building scheme

passed in August, 1916. Many quotations

could be given to show that the people of any means certain that the people as Japan believe, rightly or wrongly, that a naval competition does exist between their country and the United States, and it is in this fact that we find a clue to the reported development of anti-American sentiment in Japan.

Taxation in that country is now extremely heavy, as well it may be, considering that cent, of the total revenue is devoured by the War Office and the Navy Department. The people are taught by their newspapers to regard the United States as the chief cause of this crushing taxation.

"If"-so runs the argument-"the Americans were not piling up naval armaments with the object of gaining the mastery of the Pacific, there would be no occasion for Japan to waste her substance on battleships. But, as things are, she is compelled in self-defence to maintain an adequate navy. Every addition the Americans make to their fleet must be counterbalanced so far as possible by adding to ourr. In this way, therefore, the standard of Japanese taxation is more or less reguiated from Wachington."

The Japanese Government is indignant at the suggestion that its fleet is meant to be used aggressively. It would be impossible, they argue, for Japan to attack the United States, even if she wished to do so. The distance between the two countries is so great that no Japanese force could attack the American coast without a nearby base from which to operate, and no such base exists.

## No Thought of Aggression,

But "Defence" Is Elastic Term Probably it is true that the function of Japanese navy is a defensive one, but nce" is a very elastic term, and in articular case it need not be taken literally. Japan is not merely conher own coasts and her rne commerce. She has large and ng interests in China, and it is to deese interests as much as the integher own soil that she is spending so lavishly on battleships. rity

purpose behind the "eight-eight" mon to make herself strong enough The interference with her policy in schem m the United States or any other to res Dr. as a commentator in Japan China ! quarter.

recently at navy is to be built for the of enabling things to be done "This mainland and present them sole purp accomplished facts, without on the Asi risk of the Powers offering to the worl as they offered in 1895 rerunning th otung Peninsula. The naval 'advice' suc t for the purpose of being garding the I or the purpose of deterring expansion is ive action should for any aggressive, but protest if aggre

en whether the "eightreason be com will prove to be as im-It remains to eight" program: mutable as the la fight to the last ditch sians. There is the ruling classes nodify it, nor is it by before consenting

whole are in favor of cutting down the programme. The big political parties have adopted naval "preparedness" as one of the main planks in their respective platforms.

Only a few months ago Mr. Ozaki, a shining light of the powerful Kensei-Kai-a faction which formerly held a majority in the Imperial Diet-was expelled from the party nominally because of his too liberal views on the suffrage question, but actually because he had ventured to urge a reduction of naval expenditure. Since his expulsion Mr. Ozaki has been touring the country and making speeches in favor of pruning down the "eight-eight" scheme, but he does not appear to have met with great success.

Nor, after all, does public opinion count for very much in Japan in matters of this kind. Questions of high policy are invariably decided by the military chiefs, and if their decisions run counter to the wishes of the people the latter have no real means of protesting against them.

#### International Agreement Only Could Stop the Programme

their decision there is no appeal.

Short of an international agreement for the curtailment of armaments the "eighteight" programme is almost certain to be carried out in full, despite the tremendous cost, for the heads of state have declared it to be indispensable to Japan, and from

Nevertheless, thoughtful Japanese are growing alarmed at the dimensions of naval expenditure. It is pointed out by Dr. Suchiro of the Kyoto Imperial University that even to-day, when the "eight-eight" fleet is far from complete, the naval budget already amounts to yen 490,000,000, equivalent to 32 per cent. of State expenditure is completed the ordinary and extraordi- in main details the American battle cruis which exceeds the total amount of revenue from taxation in 1921.

'It is evident," says Dr. Suehiro, "that such a navy is disproportionate to the resources of the country, and that it will exhaust her strength and hinder her prog-

But these and many similar utterances which could be quoted seem to make no impression on the Elder Statesmen, who see in naval power one of the two instruments that are absolutely necessary for the furtherance of their policies in China.

The other instrument is an army stronger than any foreign force that could be descatched to the Far East within a reasonable period of time. The Japanese Government has fixed twenty-one divisions as the minimum standard of strength for the army, and up to now has turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of a lower figure. The world will watch with interest the outcome of this attempt by a State whose financial resources are relatively small to support a large army and a large navy at one and the same time. Germany, with infinitely doubt whatever that greater resources, found the pace growing rather too hot even before the war, and there are not a few economists who pre-

# Year 1927 Would Find Island Empire With 25 Most Modern Capital Ships Compared With 35 U. S. Craft.

dict that Japan is heading straight for in- 7,000 tons. These, apparently, are addisolvency.

In view of the many contradictory statements which have appeared on the subject, a brief analysis of the "eight-eight" scheme will not be out of place. Of the sixteen capital ships covered by the programme only one has been completed to date. This is the battleship Nagato, of 33,800 tons, 23 knots speed, mounting eight 16-inch guns. Her sister ship, the Mutsu, is practically finished and will soon be in service. They will be joined in 1922-23 by the Kaga and Tosa, 39,000 to 40,000 tons, 23 knots, mounting ten or twelve 16-inch guns, both ships having been laid down last year.

#### Eight-Eight Programme Not Very Far Advanced

Battleships No. 5 and No. 6 are the Owari and Kil, 45,000 tons, 23 knots, twelve 16-inch guns, which have been ordered but not yet begun, and 1924 is the very earliest date by which they can be com pleted. The two final battleships of the programme are "C" and "D," not yet named, and of whose characteristics nothing is known. They cannot be in service before 1926, and may, in fact, be delayed another year.

The remaining eight ships are battle cruisers. Two of these, the Amagi and Akagi, were begun in December last and may be completed by the end of 1923. They are ships of 43,500 tons, 33 knots speed, for the fiscal year 1921-22. When the fleet and eight 16-inch guns, thus resembling nary expenditure will total yen 800,000,000, ers of the Constellation class. After them come the Atago and Takao, said to be of similar design. They were ordered last year but will not be laid down till next February or March

The four remaining battle cruisers have not yet been named, but they are credited with 46,000 tons, 34 knots speed and a battery of 18-inch guns. They will probably come into service by 1926-27. This completes the total of sixteen big ships authorized by the "eight-eight" project.

It should be said in passing that the designs of vessels not yet begun may be mod ified. Admiral Kato, the Minister of Marine, stated last year that Japanese policy would be influenced by what went on abroad. This means that if bigger and faster ships and heavier guns are adopted elsewhere Japan will follow suit. She has already designed, and by now may have built, an experimental 18-inch gun firing a 3,300 pound shell.

Besides the sixteen new ships described above, the Japanese navy already contains five dreadnought battleships and four battle cruisers, completed between 1912 and 1918, and most of these will be serviceable in 1927, when the "eight-eight" programme is completed. By that date, therefore, Japan ten less than the American total. But her self-control clear vision, happiness and even inferiority will be somewhat less than the figures indicate, because her earlier dreadnoughts are of later, larger and more powerful design than the corresponding Ameri-

#### New Information at Hand On Japan's Light Cruisers

The position in regard to light cruisers is not so clear. According to the "eighteight" scheme, only twelve such vessels were to be laid down between 1921 and 1926. But the Secretary of the British Admiralty announced, on April 6, 1921, that the number of light cruisers which Japan had then to complete was twenty-six, in-

tional to the nine modern light cruisers already in service. Consequently, if the British naval authorities are well informed, Japan will eventually have a total of thirtyfive fast cruisers; whereas the American navy will possess only ten.

Including boats already completed, the execution of the "eight-eight" programme will bring the total of destroyers to fortyfour first class boats (over 1,000 tons) and seventy-eight second class boats (under 1,000 tons). The utmost secrecy is maintained as to the present and future strength of the submarine flotilla, and, as will be noticed, the total of these boats authorized in the "eight-eight" scheme is vaguely referred to as "a certain number."

Reliable information shows that eighty submarines have been built, laid down, or authorized to date, while from twenty to forty additional boats are to be commenced between 1922 and 1927.

This, then, is the famous "eight-eight" programme which the Japanese Government declares to be its irreducible standard of naval power. The financial provisions were based on prices ruling last year, and also on the assumption that no extraordinary increase in warship displacements will occur during the next six years. If, on the contrary, the cost of labor and material increase, or some new development leads to a sudden jump in the size of capital ships, every calculation will be upset, and the bill for nagal armaments will reach a figure at which

Whatever one may think of the wisdom or the expediency of this ambitious scheme, it is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration from the brand of patriotism which induces a people to deny itself all but the bare necessities of life in order to

keep the armed forces strong and efficient. So far as the political aspect is concerned the very fact that Japan's rulers are prepared to drain the national treasury and risk a popular upheaval rather than curtail the forces which are to guarantee them immunity from foreign interference, shows very clearly what importance they attach to gaining a free hand in China.

## Value of Deep Breaths

INGERS are not the only persons who need to learn to breathe deeply; the practice is good for every one, say the neurologists, and they add that we of the Western lands have paid altogether too little attention to correct respiration and still less to the good effects of deep breathing.

In the Orient they look very differently upon it and lay great stress upon its constant and regular practice. The Eastern will dispose of twenty-five capital ships, or philosophers teach that the mental powers, morals are dependent in great measure upon

this practice of deep breathing. It includes the play of the whole respiratory apparatus-every part of the lungs, to be brought into action. In modified oreathing only part of the cells are filled with oxygenated air, and the muscles are

only partly employed.

To sbreathe deeply requires that one should stand erect and inhale steadily through the nostrils. First fill the lower part of the lung, then the middle part by pushing out the lower ribs and breastbone, and finally the higher part by elevating the chest. Hold the breath for a few seconds and exhale slowly through the mouth.

Deep breathing promotes a sort of mas-sage of the internal organs and produces a cluding four large vessels of more than soothing effect on the nerves.

